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1, Do unmarried cohabiting couples fall outside the scope 
of the Fair Employment and Housing Act's protection from housing 
discrimination on the basis of marital status?
2. If the Fair Employment and Housing Act's protections 
apply to unmarried cohabiting couples, should the strict scrutiny 
test be utilized to determine whether Mrs. Smith's 
constitutionally protected religious beliefs exempt her from the
Act?
3 Does the state have any compelling interest to justify 
the severe infringement that the Fair Employment and Housing Act 
and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission's order place on 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
EVELYN SMITH, )
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FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, )
)
Defendant and Respondent, )
)
KENNETH C. PHILLIPS, et al., )
)
Real Parties in Interest. )
_________)
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal From a Decision by the 
Fair Employment and Housing Commission
Review Following Writ of Mandate and Decision of the 
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
Kenneth Phillips and Gail Randall ("Real Parties in 
Interest") filed identical written complaints with the Department 
of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") alleging that Mrs. Evelyn 
Smith ("Respondent") violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act 
("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12955, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
by committing an act of housing discrimination. (C.T. 2.)
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Phillips and Randall alleged they were denied rental access to 
Mrs. Smith’s one bedroom apartment because of their status as an 
unmarried cohabiting couple. (C.T. 2.) Based on Phillips 
complaint, the DFEH issued two accusations against Mrs. Smith
claiming violations of the FEHA. liL.
On April 25 and 26, 1988, an administrative hearing was 
held. (C.T. 2.) However, the Commission decided not to adopt 
the administrative law judge’s proposed decision. Instead,
in a decision dated August 17, 1989, the Commission found that 
Mrs. Smith had violated the FEHA by denying rental access to 
Phillips on the basis of his marital status. (C.T. 10.) As a 
result, the Commission ordered Mrs. Smith to: (1) cease and 
desist discriminating against potential tenants on the basis of 
their marital status; (2) pay out of pocket and emotional 
distress damages totaling $952; (3) post a notice for ninety days 
that she violated the FEHA by refusing to rent to unmarried 
couples; (4) permanently post notice in her rental units of 
renters' rights and remedies under the FEHA; (5) sign the 
notices; and (6) provide copies of the notices to all potential 
tenants. (C.T. 14.)
Mrs. Smith petitioned the Butte County Superior Court for a 
writ of mandate to compel the Commission to set aside its 
decision. (C.T. 19.) The Third District Court of Appeal issued 
an alternative writ to decide the constitutionality of the FEHA 
as applied to landlords whose religious beliefs forbid them from 
renting to unmarried cohabiting couples. (C.T. 38.)
The Third Appellate District for the Court of Appeal held 
that the Commission's order violated Mrs. Smith's federal and
2
state constitutional rights. Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. 
CoTtim'n. 30 Cal. App, 4th 1008, 1014 (1994). The Commission 
petitioned for rehearing. (C.T. 58.) The Court of Appeal made 
minor modifications to its decision which did not alter the 
judgment, and the Commission’s petition was denied. (C.T. 60.) 
The Commission petitioned this Court for review on July 1, 1994, 
(C.T. 62), and this Court granted review on September 8, 1994. 
(C.T. 64.)
Statement of Facts
Evelyn Smith owns and leases four rental units located in 
Chico, California. (C.T. 2.) Mrs. Smith is a devout Christian, 
and has been a member of the Bidwell Presbyterian Church for 
approximately twenty-five years. (C.T. 3.) Mrs. Smith believes 
that it is sinful to have sex outside of marriage, and that it 
would be a sin for her to rent her units to people who will 
engage in non-marital sex on her property. Id. Mrs. Smith also 
believes that if she permits people to engage in non-marital sex 
in her rental units, God will judge her and prevent her from 
meeting her deceased husband in heaven. Id.
Mrs. Smith advertised the availability of one of her units 
in the Chico Enterprise Record during March and April of 1987. 
(C.T. 3.) In response to the advertisement, Kenneth Phillips and 
Gail Randall called Mrs. Smith to arrange to see the unit. liL. 
During this phone conversation, Mrs. Smith informed them that she 
preferred to rent to married couples. Id. Phillips falsely 
represented to Mrs. Smith that he was married to Randall. 14^
On or about April 7, 1987, Randall and Phillips executed a 
lease agreement with Mrs. Smith for a month-to-month tenancy.
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(C.T. 4.) Randall signed the lease agreement "Gail Phillips." 
Id. Randall and Phillips paid Mrs. Smith a security deposit of 
one hundred and fifty dollars. liL. Later that day, Phillips 
called Mrs. Smith and informed her that he and Randall were not 
married. Id. Mrs. Smith told him that she could not rent to an 
unmarried cohabiting couple because it would violate her 




California Government Code section 12955, the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act, does not protect unmarried cohabiting 
couples from housing discrimination. The legislative history 
indicates that the Act was designed to protect classes of persons 
such as widows, divorcees, and single women with children, 
communal living situations, and homosexuals. Further, prior 
decisions of California Courts of Appeal which held that marital 
status protects unmarried cohcd)iting couples did not specifically 
decide the status issue, and are factually distinguishable from 
our case.
If this Court decides that unmarried cohabiting couples are 
protected by the FEHA, the compelling state interest test is the 
proper method for analyzing Mrs. Smith's free exercise 
infringement claims. This Court may decide this case on 
independent state constitutional grounds alone, and thus apply 
the compelling state interest test, as this Court always has, to 
Mrs. Smith's claims. But even if this Court decides to follow 
the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Employment Division. 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (gmith), the 
compelling state interest test must be used because Mrs. Smith's 
case presents a "hybrid" situation under the Smith rule.
Moreover, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was passed 
by Congress to overrule Smith, commands the application of the 
compelling state interest test as well. So no matter which of 
these authorities this Court uses to decide this case, the 
compelling state interest test supplies the proper method of 
analysis.
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Under the compelling state interest test, California does 
not have a compelling interest in promoting the housing rights of 
unmarried cohabiting couples which justifies the siobstantial 
burden the FEHA places on Mrs. Smith's free exercise rights. The 
FEHC’s ruling imposes a severe burden on her free exercise of 
religion by forcing her to perform an act which is prohibited by 
her religious beliefs. Her First Amendment free speech rights 
are also violated by the FEHC's ruling, as she was compelled to 
sign and display notices promoting views which are repugnant to 
her religious convictions.
The state does not have an interest in preventing housing 
discrimination against unmarried couples that is sufficiently 
compelling to justify infringing on Mrs. Smith's free exercise. 
The lack of a compelling interest is demonstrated by the 
legislature's failure to extend equal rights to this group in 
response to the numerous judicial decisions which have upheld 
discrimination against unmarried couples. The legislature did 
not intend to require the same protections for unmarried couples 
as those given to other classes, such as race and gender. Thus, 
the state's interest in enforcing the FEHA against Mrs. Smith is 
superseded by her right to free expression.
6
ARGUMENT
I. THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT DOES NOT PROTECT
UNMARRIED COHABITING COUPLES FROM DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING 
ON THE BASIS OF MARITAL STATUS.
California Government Code section 12955, also known as the
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful: (a) For the owner of any housing 
accommodation to discriminate against any person 
because of the . . . marital status . . . of that 
person, [and] (d) For any person subject to the 
provisions of Section 51 of the Civil Code, as that 
section applies to housing accommodations, to 
discriminate against any person on the basis of . . . 
marital status, . . or on any other basis prohibited 
by that section.
A. Prior Derisions By California Courts Of Appeal Are Not
Determinative Of Whether Unmarried Cohabiting Couples
Are Included In The Definition Of Marital Status.
The two prior California Court of Appeal cases which held 
that unmarried cohabiting couples are included in the definition 
of marital status are not controlling in this case. First, 
neither the Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission court, 
138 Cal. App. 3d 232 (1982), nor the Atkisson v. Kern County 
Hniisina Authority court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 89 (1976), specifically 
addressed what the term "marital status" means, and an opinion 
cannot be an authority for an issue which is not addressed in the 
court's decision. See People v. Harris. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1071 
(1989) . Further, the two cases were decided on the basis of 
issues different from those present in Mrs. Smith's case. The 
Afkisson court held that a county housing authority's policy 
which forbade low income, unmarried cohabiting couples from 
living in public housing "automatically excludes all unmarried
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cohabiting adults; a class of persons defined by their marital 
status." Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 96. However, at the time 
Atkisson was decided, the FEHA did not include a marital status 
provision, and the case was decided on federal constitutional 
rights and "a general policy statement related to public housing 
as expressed by the state of California." lA^ at 99 (emphasis 
added) . Therefore, since Mrs. Smith's case comes at a time when 
the FEHA does include a marital status provision, which remains 
undefined as to what classes of persons marital status includes, 
Atkisson is distinguishable and is not controlling.
Hess is also distinguishable and is thus not determinative 
of the outcome in this case. Hess dealt with a landlord's 
practice of requiring both members of an unmarried couple to 
financially qualify for housing, while only requiring one spouse 
from a married couple to qualify. Hess. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 235. 
The court held that this distinction was unlawful marital status 
discrimination which was not justified by a legitimate business 
purpose. Id. at 236. This case is distinguishable because it 
was the business practice of requiring unmarried couples to 
separately qualify for housing which was being analyzed in this 
case, and not the issue of marital status itself. Id. In 
addition, the court analogized to a federal credit act, and not 
the FEHA, in deciding that the landlord's act of requiring 
unmarried couples to separately qualify was an unlawful act of 
discrimination. Id. Because Atkisson and Hess are not 
controlling, this Court is free to hold that unmarried cohabitin' 
couples are not protected by the FEHA's provision which forbids j 
discrimination on the basis of marital status.
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B. The Legislature Did Not Intend The Fair Employment Anq
HovisinQ Act To Protect Unmarried Cohabiting Coupigs.
To determine whether the Fair Employment and Housing Act 
protects unmarried cohabiting couples from housing 
discrimination, the legislative intent behind the Act must be 
analyzed. People v- Overstreet. 42 Cal. 3d 891, 895 (1986).
In so doing, the first step is to give plain meaning to the words 
of the FEHA. People v. Craf^. 41 Cal. 3d 554, 559-60 (1986).
If the language provides a clear answer, statutory construction 
is unnecessary. People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1007-08 
(1987) . But if the language is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation, this Court must look to additional 
sources for guidance, such as the legislative history of the Act 
and contemporaneous administrative construction of the Act.
The term "marital status" is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation. It can either be construed narrowly 
to classify people as either married or single, or construed 
broadly to classify people as either married or unmarried, 
whether they live alone or cohabit with another. Thus, this 
Court must look to the additional sources cited in Woodhead. 43 
Cal. 3d at 1007-08, to determine whether unmarried cohabiting 
couples are protected by the FEHA,
The history of the FEHA's development suggests that the 
legislature was most concerned with classes of people other than 
unmarried cohabiting couples. For example, in a letter to 
then-Governor Edmund Brown, the Chairman of the Senate Select 
Committee and Housing and Urban Affairs stated that the need for 
the FEHA was based on the fact that "[s] ingle women (and single 
men) experience discrimination because of landlord stereotypes of
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the nuclear family and the misconduct and financial 
irresponsibility of single persons, divorcees and widows with 
children experience discrimination that would not be experienced 
by single fathers with children." (C.T. 50.) (emphasis added) 
Nowhere in the letter are unmarried cohabiting couples mentioned. 
Thus, divorced, widowed, and single women with children, and not 
unmarried cohabiting couples, are those whom the drafters of the 
FEHA intended to protect.
Moreover, the opposition to the FEHA also supports the 
conclusion that the Act was not intended to protect unmarried 
cohabiting couples. The California Association of Realtors, who 
opposed the FEHA, stated that their concern with 
anti-discrimination laws regarded "singles apartments, communes, 
and homosexual liaisons," and the "creat[ion] [of] a state
mechanism to prohibit selection of tenants -- even in the
interest of other tenants of the same project--on the basis of
certain life styles." (C.T. 46.) The Association noted that 
this would have a negative effect in instances where screening 
can prevent "admission of those tenants . . . [which] would 
precipitate vacancies of . . . units occupied by families with 
small children who might not wish those children exposed to those 
life styles." (C.T. 47.) Thus, the fact that unmarried 
cohabiting couples were not one of the groups the Realtors' 
Association was worried about not being able to pre-screen 
strongly suggests that such couples were not intended to be 
protected by the legislators who wrote the FEHA.
Although the legislature made only minor changes (which did 
not provide any greater guidance as to the meaning of "marital
10
status") to the FEHA after Atkisson. this does not amount to 
legislative agreement with the Atkisson decision. In ^arrig 
f;*apital Rrowth Investors XIV. 52 Cal, 3d 1142, 1156 (1991), this 
Court stated that "something more than mere silence is required 
before that acquiescence is elevated into a species of implied 
legislation." Thus, the legislature's failure to respond in this 
case should not be determinative of this issue. Rather, since 
"legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which to lean, " the 
legislature's apparent intent to exclude unmarried cohabiting 
couples from the FEHA's protection should outweigh their lack of 
response to Atkisson and Hess. Tygy Indyg • lU
orrupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. App. 3d 379,
391 (1986).
II. IF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT PROTECTS UNMARRIED
COHABITING COUPLES FROM HOUSING DISCRIMINATION, THEN MRS.
SMITH'S FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS SHOULD BE ANALYZED UNDER THE
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST.
A. Independent State Constitutional Grounds Suppprt The
TTrp Of The Compelling State Interest Test And Provide A
Basis For Exempting Mrs. Smith From The Fair Employment
And Housing Act.
1. California Mav Interpret Its Constitution Mqre
Broadly Than The United States Supreme
Interprets The Federal Constitution,.
This Court need look no further than our state constitution 
to find a basis for exempting Mrs. Smith from California 
Government Code section 12955. In City of Mescruit^ —Aladdin's 
castle. Inc.. 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that "a state court is entirely free to read its own 
state's constitution more broadly than this Court reads the
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Federal Constitution, " reasoning that state courts are in a 
better position to recognize the subtle differences in state law 
which would provide for a broader interpretation of state rights. 
Accordingly, the Court has held that states have the sovereign 
right to "adopt in [their] own constitution[s] individual 
liberties more expansive than those conferred by [their] federal
counterpart." Prunevard Shopping Ctr. v._Robing, 447 U.S. 74, 8l
(1980). Furthermore, if a state supreme court relies exclusively 
and independently on its own constitution to provide greater 
protection of a given right than the federal constitution, that 
decision is final and is immune from review by any federal court. 
See Michigan v, Lnno. 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); Hgrk_v_ 
Pitcairn. 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945). Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has granted this Court the authority to decide this case solely 
on the basis of the California Constitution.
This Court has indicated that it concurs with the U.S. 
Supreme Court's assertion that state constitutions may be 
interpreted more broadly than the federal constitution. For 
example, in People v. Brisendine. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-51 (1975), 
this Court stated that "the California Constitution is, and has 
always been, a doctrine of independent force," and that states 
are "independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of 
their citizens." Another example is found in Sands v. Morgnoo 
Unified School District. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 883 (1991), where this 
Court held that "although federal cases may supply guidance for 
interpreting [the religion clause of the California 
Constitution], California courts must independently determine its 
scope." For this proposition, this Court cited a Court of Appeal
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case which recognized that "California courts alone determine the 
rights guaranteed by the California Constitution so long as those 
rights extend equal or greater protection to those guaranteed by 
the federal constitution under totally similar provisions of the 
Bill of Rights." Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist.i 193
Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1017 (1987).
The support for this proposition can be traced back to 
nah-rieni v. Knickerbocker. 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89 (1938), where this 
Court originally asserted that state courts are not bound by an 
interpretation of a federal constitutional provision in 
interpreting a similar state constitutional provision. Moreover, 
this Court stated in Sands that "as the Supreme Court of 
California, we are the final arbiters of the meaning of state 
constitutional provisions." Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 883 (emphasis 
added); see also Raven v. Deukmeiian. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 354 (1990). 
Thus, this Court's own precedent supports its ability to 
interpret the California free exercise clause more broadly than 
its federal counterpart.
2. The California Constitution's Free Exercise Clause
Is Broader Than Its Federal Counterpart,^
Article I, section 4 of the California Constitution states 
in relevant part: "The free exercise and enjoyment of religion 
without discrimination or preference are guaranteed. This 
liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or 
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the State. The 
Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . ." The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
13
thereof. •’
California precedent supports the fact that the religious 
freedoms guaranteed by the California Constitution are broader 
than those granted by the federal constitution. In g^briglli v. 
Knickerbocker. 12 Cal. 2d at 89, this Court noted that "our state 
constitution contains an express guaranty of freedom of religion 
[while] [t]he federal constitution does not contain a 
similar express provision . . . ." Further, in gands« 53 Cal. 3d 
at 882-83, this Court agreed with the California Attorney 
General's analysis of the free exercise clause, which concluded 
that [i]t would be difficult to imagine a more sweeping 
statement of the principle of government impartiality in the 
field of religion, 25 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 316, 319 (1955) , and 
noted that California courts have interpreted the state provision 
as being more protective of the principle of separation of church 
and state than the federal counterpart. Thus, this Court's 
previous decisions support the conclusion that Article I, section 
4 of the California Constitution is broader than its federal 
counterpart.
The legislative history of California's free exercise clause 
also shows that the drafters intended it to be broader than the 
corresponding clause found in the federal constitution. As 
originally adopted. Article I, section 4 provided that "[t]he 
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, 
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in 
this State." However, in 1879 the Constitutional Convention 
strengthened the language of this clause by replacing the word 
"allowed" with "guaranteed." In explaining this change,
14
delegate O’Sullivan stated:
I propose this amendment, because it is quite evident 
that the word "allowed" conveys the idea that the right 
to disallow or deny exists. Now, sir, I deny that any 
Government or any power on earth has a right to grant 
or deny freedom of religious belief .... Our 
Government, being republican, should guarantee full 
liberty to the citizen in his actions. "Guarantee," 
therefore, is the proper word .... 3 Debates and
Proceedings, Cal. Const. Convention 1878-79, p. 1171.
Thus, the importance placed on the word "guarantee" supports the 
proposition that the framers intended the clause to provide the 
strongest and most absolute guarantee of religious freedom 
possible, and is thus broader than the federal free exercise 
clause.
3 . California Precedent Supports Independent Rgli^nge
On The State Constitution And Application Qf Thg
Cnmpellina State Interest Test In Deciding Free
Exercise Claims.
Because this Court has decided two previous cases at least 
in part on independent state grounds, the Court may rest its 
decision in our case squarely on Article I, section 4 of the 
California Constitution. In Molko v. Holy Spirit Agg'n, 46 Cal. 
3d 1092, 1119 (1988), this Court held that "neither the federal 
nor state Constitution" barred plaintiffs from bringing 
traditional fraud actions against the Unification Church in a 
case where its members were accused of inducing plaintiffs, by 
misrepresenting and concealing the Church's identity, into a 
setting where they were unknowingly subjected to "coercive 
persuasion." It is clear that this Court rested its decision at 
least partly on state constitutional grounds because it held that 
the state constitution did not bar the tort claims, and that an 
"applicable principle" in this case is that "California
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guarantees free exercise and disestablishment in the state 
constitution." Molko. 46 Cal. 3d at 1112. Then, only one month 
after the decision in Molko. this Court again considered 
California's free exercise clause in concluding that "the First 
Amendment and it California equivalent" did not bar criminal 
prosecution of a mother who sought to use free exercise as a 
defense when her child died of meningitis after receiving prayer 
treatment instead of medical attention. WalKSP Ct_t_
of Sacramento Countv. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 141 (1988). Thus, this 
Court has clearly laid the groundwork for deciding Mrs. Smith's 
case on the basis of independent state constitutional grounds 
alone.
Moreover, this Court has specifically adopted and employed 
the compelling state interest analysis as a matter of state 
constitutional law. In Molko. this Court specifically based its 
decision on state grounds, and reiterated its long-held approach
to the analysis of free exercise claims:
Government action burdening religious conduct is 
subject to a balancing test, in which the importance of 
a state's interest is weighted against the severity of 
the burden imposed on religion. The greater the burden 
imposed on religion, the more compelling must be the 
government interest at stake. A government action 
that passes the balancing test must also meet the 
further requirements that (1) no action imposing a 
lesser burden on religion would satisfy the 
government's interest and (2) the action does not 
discriminate between religions, or between 
religion and nonreligion. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1113.
Then, only one month after the decision in Molko, this Court 
again used the compelling state interest test in deciding state 
free exercise claims. Walker. 47 Cal. 3d at 139-41. Further,
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because this Court has affirmed its belief that "the right to 
free religious expression embodies a precious heritage of our 
history," People v. Woodv. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727 (1964), both 
public policy and precedent support the use of the compelling 
state interest test in analyzing free exercise claims under the 
state constitution.
B. Mrs. Smith's Case Presents A "Hybrid" Situation Undgg
The Federal Constitution And Thus Must Be Analyzed
Under The Compelling State Interest Test^
1. The United States Supreme Court's Ruling In
Employment Division. Department Of Human R^spurces
nf Oregon v. Smith Did Not Eliminate The
rompellina State Interest Test As A Mode 01
Analysis In All Cases Of Free Exercise
Infringement.
Even if this Court decides to apply the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Employment Division. Department of Human Resources .of 
Oregon v. Smith (Smith) . 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the compelling 
state interest test still must be used to analyze Mrs. Smith's 
claims. Up until the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Smith, 
free exercise claims were subject to the same compelling state 
interest test that this Court used in Molko and Walker: 
government regulation is not unconstitutional either (1) if it 
does not infringe on constitutional free exercise rights or (2) 
if it does infringe on these rights, but the burden on free 
exercise rights is justified by a compelling state interest in 
regulating a matter which is within the state’s power to 
regulate. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). The 
party claiming free exercise infringement must show "the coercive 
effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the 
practice of his religion." Abbington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
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U.S. 203, 223 (1963). If the party indeed establishes that his 
free exercise rights have been infringed, the infringement is
subjected to strict scrutiny. Hobbie vl._ILne^nplpyrnent; Appeals
Comm’n of Fla. . 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987). It then becomes the 
state's burden to show that a compelling state interest justifies 
the infringement, and that the enactment provides the least 
restrictive means of reaching the state's end. ghgrbprt« 374 
U.S. at 406-09.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in gmith, however, 
purported to alter the method of analysis to be applied to most 
free exercise claims. In Smith. 494 U.S. at 874, two drug 
rehabilitation counselors were fired from their jobs because they 
ingested peyote^ for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their 
Native American Church. When they applied to the Employment 
Division for unemployment compensation, they were deemed 
ineligible to receive the benefits because they were discharged 
for "work-related 'misconduct.'" Id. The Oregon Supreme Court 
ruled that they could not be denied benefits based on conduct 
that is protected by the First Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution, Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision, and in so 
doing, set forth a new test for most claims of free exercise 
infringement. The Court held that "if prohibiting the exercise 
of religion ... is not the object of the [law] but merely the 
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid 
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." Smith.
494 U.S. at 878. Further, the Court stated that it had never
' Peyote is a controlled substance under Oregon state law.
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held that "an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance" with such a law. Smith/ 494 U.S. at 878-79. The 
Court held that the First Amendment prohibits laws only if the 
state seeks "to ban acts . . . only when they are engaged in for 
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that 
they display, " and that religious motivation does not place 
conduct "beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not 
specifically directed at the religious practice." at 877-78
(emphasis added) . Thus, the general test to be applied to most 
free exercise infringement claims was dramatically altered.
However, the Court did retain the compelling state interest 
test for "hybrid situations," which are defined as cases which 
involve "not [only] the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press." Smitli, 
494 U.S. at 881. Although the Court found that the Smith case 
did not present a "hybrid" situation, it did cite examples of 
such cases, which involved free exercise claims that affected 
other constitutional protections, ranging from freedom of speech 
to parental rights. Among the examples the Court listed
were "cases prohibiting compelled expression, decided exclusively 
upon free speech grounds [that] also involved freedom of 
religion." Id. at 882. Therefore, in cases where a law 
infringes upon free speech rights as well as free exercise 
rights, the method of analysis remains the compelling state 
interest test. Id. at 881, 884-85.
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2. The Facts Tn Mrs. Smith's Case Prgggnt A "Hybrid”
.q-iMiaf-inn Unf^^r The United States Supreme Court's
Analysis- And Thus The Compelling State Interest
Test Must- Be Applied To Her Free Exercise
Infringement Claims^
The facts of our case present a "hybrid" situation whose 
outcome must be determined under the compelling state interest 
test because, although the FEHA is admittedly a law which is 
neutral on its face, Mrs. Smith's free speech and free exercise 
rights are implicated. Her free speech rights were violated by 
the FEHC's requirement that, as a penalty for violating the FEHA, 
she was compelled to sign and post notices in her rental 
properties for ninety days stating that she had been found guilty 
of housing discrimination on the basis of marital status. 
Additionally, Mrs. Smith was ordered to sign and permanently post 
those portions of the FEHA which define the rules which prohibit 
marital status discrimination in housing. Simply put, not only 
is Mrs. Smith being forced to commit a sin, according to her 
religious beliefs, by being forced to rent to unmarried 
cohabiting couples in the future, but she is also being forced to 
speak by signing and posting notices on her own property which 
proclaim rules and values which are repugnant to her religious 
beliefs. Thus, the facts of this case present the type of 
"hybrid" situation outlined by the Court in Smith, and the
compelling state interest test must be applied.
3. United States Supreme Court Precedent Supports The
Conclusion That Mrs,. Smith's Case .Presents A
"Hybrid" Situation Under The United States Supreme
Court's Analysis And Is Thus Subject To The
Compelling State Interest Test.
Precedent which the U.S. Supreme Court cited as exemplary of 
"hybrid" situations supports the finding that the facts in Mrs.
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Smith's case also present a "hybrid" situation, requiring this 
Court to apply a compelling state interest analysis. In Woglgy 
430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977), a husband and wife, both 
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith, sought injunctive 
relief to prohibit the state of New Hampshire from forcing them 
to "advertis[e] a slogan which [they found] morally, ethically, 
religiously and politically abhorrent." The slogan in question 
was the state motto, "Live Free or Die," which appears on state 
vehicle license plates. 14^ at 706. The Court found that the 
state statute compelling this motto to appear on their license 
plates "in effect require[d] that appellees use their private 
property as a 'mobile billboard- for the State's ideological 
message - or suffer a penalty." at 715. Further, the Court
stated that in enacting a law "which forces an individual, as 
part of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering 
public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds 
unacceptable," the state "invades the sphere of intellect and 
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our 
Constitution to reserve from all official control." I4i- The 
Court applied the compelling state interest test and found that 
the state's interest was not compelling enough to justify the 
substantial infringement on the parties' personal liberties. Id^ 
at 716.
The facts in Mrs. Smith's case are substantially similar to 
those in Woolev to classify it as a "hybrid" case involving the 
same rights -- free exercise and free speech. It is clear that 
Mrs. Smith's free exercise rights are involved, as were the 
parties' in Wooley. because if forced to abide by the FEHA, she
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will be forced to engage in conduct and promote beliefs contrary 
to her religious principles. But Wpolgy supports Mrs. Smith's 
contention that her free speech rights are implicated as well, as 
this right "includes both the right to speak freely and the right 
to refrain from speaking at all ... - The right to speak and 
the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components 
of the broader concept of -individual freedom of mind.'" Woplgy, 
430 U.S. at 714 (citing Rnard of EdUC. v. Barn$tte> 319 U.S. 624, 
633-34, 637 (1942)). Therefore, the fact that Mrs, Smith is 
forced to make, rather than prevented from making, statements
which contradict her religious beliefs
works no less an infringement of [her] constitutional 
rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the 
notion that an individual should be free to believe as 
he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs 
should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather 
than coerced by the State. Abood v.—Detrpit—Bd-s—Sf 
Educ.. 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).
Accordingly, the FEHC’s order forces Mrs. Smith "to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence," as New Hampshire's
state law in Woolev did, to a rule which she finds morally and
religiously unacceptable. Thus, her free exercise and free
speech rights are implicated and present a "hybrid," and the
Commission needs a compelling state interest and must use the
least restrictive means possible when infringing on her rights.
C, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Commands The Use
Of The Compelling State Interest Test In Analyzing Mrs.
Smith's Free Exercise Infringement Claims.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C.A,
§ 2000bb, which was signed into law on November 16, 1993 by 
President Bill Clinton, compels this Court to decide Mrs. Smith's 
free exercise claims by applying the compelling state interest
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test. Congress reasoned that the constitution's framers 
"recognizted] free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, 
and hence "governments should not substantially burden religious 
exercise without compelling justification." 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb 
(a)(1) and (a)(3). Further, since "laws 'neutral' toward 
religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended 
to interfere with religious exercise," the stated purpose of the 
RFRA is "to restore the compelling state interest test as set 
forth in fiherbert v. Verner. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wigcpnsin v. 
Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972)," and to "turn the clock back to the 
day before Smith was decided." Id. at (a) (2) and (b) (1) and H.R. 
Rep. 103-88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., Judiciary Comm., p. 15. The 
House Judicial Committee recognized that the compelling state 
interest test, for many years and with rare exception, had been 
used to examine free exercise claims, and that the Smith decision 
represented "an abrupt, unexpected rejection of long-standing 
Supreme Court precedent." Id. at 3. At the signing ceremony for 
the RFRA, President Bill Clinton stated that the Act 
"reestablishes a standard that better protects all Americans of 
all faiths in the exercise of their religion in a way that I am 
convinced is far more consistent with the intent of the Founders 
of this nation than the Supreme Court decision." President Bill 
Clinton, Remarks at the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Signing 
Ceremony. Federal News Service, Nov. 16, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. Thus, according to both the 
legislative and the executive branches of the federal government, 
the Smith decision is overruled by the RFRA, and therefore the 
FEHA must be subjected to the strict scrutiny demanded by the
23
compelling state interest test.
III. THE STATE DOES NOT HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST WHICH
JUSTIFIES THE SUBSTANTIAL INFRINGEMENT ON MRS, SMITH'S 
RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION FOUR OF THE CALIFORNIA 
CONSTITUTION.
A. Th-ifi rniirt Always Construed The Compelling State
TntPrest Test Narrowly:^
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have 
construed the compelling state interest test narrowly. In Ypdet, 
406 U.S. at 215, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "only those 
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can 
overbalance legitimate claims to free exercise of religion." In 
Yoder, the Court held that even a state's interest in universal 
compulsory education was not sufficiently compelling to override 
an individual's freedom of religion. Id. at 221-22. Thus, this 
Court should construe the compelling interest test narrowly and 
find that the state's interest in ending housing discrimination 
against unmarried couples is not sufficiently compelling to meet 
this standard.
A state may abridge religious practices only upon a showing 
that some compelling state interest outweighs the persons 
interest in religious freedom. Woody. 61 Cal. 2d at 722-25. A 
burden on an individual's exercise of religious freedom is only 
permitted when (1) the state's interest is overriding, (2) the 
burden is essential, United States v. Lee. 455 U.S. 252, 257 
(1982), and (3) the state's interest cannot be achieved by 
alternative, less restrictive means. Thomas v. Review Bd..
Indus. Employment Sec. Div.. 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). A mere
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showing of a rational relationship to a colorable state interest 
will not suffice. Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 406.
When applying the compelling state interest test in the 
context of housing discrimination against unmarried couples, 
courts have construed the scope of the compelling interest 
narrowly. See Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 398; STTllth y_.—F^ir 
Employment & Hous. Comm'n. 30 Cal. App. 4th 1008 (1994). The 
focus has been, and must be, whether there is a compelling 
interest in ending housing discrimination against unmarried 
couples, not housing discrimination in general. AttQrngy Qen. v. 
Desilets. 418 Mass. 316, 325-26, 636 N.E. 2d 233, 238 (1994). 
Thus, this Court should also focus on marital status
discrimination rather than discrimination in general.
B. Forcing Mrs. Smith To Rent Her Apartments Tq Unmarried
rohahitina Counles Imposes A Substantial Burden Qn Her
Free Exercise Of Religion,^
Mrs. Smith is entitled to a religious exemption from the 
Fair Employment and Housing Act, which prohibits a landlord from 
discriminating against any individual on the basis of marital 
status. The initial requirement for exemption from laws for 
claimed exercise of religion is that the claimant has a sincerely 
held religious belief with regard to the contested matter.
Thomas. 450 U.S. at 714-16; Yoder. 406 U.S. at 215-16. Mrs.
Smith believes that sex outside of marriage is sinful, and that 
it is a sin for her to rent her units to people who will engage 
in non-marital sex on her property. (C.T. 4.) The sincerity of 
her beliefs is undisputed.
The ruling of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission 
("FEHC"), which compelled Mrs. Smith to rent to unmarried
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cohabiting couples, infringed on her free exercise of religion. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a law forcing an individual 
to choose between following the precepts of his or her religion 
and forfeiting benefits is an unconstitutional burden on 
religious freedom, sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. In our case, the 
burden on Mrs. Smith's religious beliefs is the choice she was 
required to make between adhering to her religious beliefs by 
refusing to rent to an unmarried cohabiting couple and modifying 
her behavior to comply with the FEHA and the FEHC's order. Thus, 
Mrs. Smith’s rights of free exercise have been substantially 
burdened.
Forcing Mrs. Smith to post signs on her property summarizing 
provisions of the FEHA also violates her First Amendment rights. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "a state measure which 
forces an individual, as part of his daily life . . . to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point 
of view he finds unacceptable" invades an individual's First 
Amendment rights. Woolev. 430 U.S. at 715. In WQQleY> the Court 
held that a state law infringed upon First Amendment rights of an 
individual by compelling him to display a license plate with a 
motto to which he had religious objections. Id^ at 715.
Similarly, Mrs. Smith was forced participate in the promotion of 
concepts which are antithetical to her religious beliefs. The 
requirement that Mrs. Smith sign and post the FEHA regulations 
was a severe burden on her religious freedom.
Even though the FEHA is a law of general applicability, it 
is constitutionally invalid in this situation because the effect 
of this statute is to prevent Mrs, Smith from observing her
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religious beliefs. Where the effect of a law is to impede the 
observance of an individual's religion, that law is 
constitutionally invalid even though the burden is indirect. 
Braunfeld v. Brown. 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). "A regulation 
which is neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless 
offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality 
if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." W^lz v, T^x 
Comm'n. 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970). Thus, forcing Mrs. Smith to 
perform acts which are prohibited by her religious beliefs 
severely burdens her religious freedom.
Even in a commercial context, the state must justify its 
regulation limiting religious freedom by showing it is essential 
to accomplish an overriding governmental interest. Our case is 
distinguishable from a true commercial case such as Jimmy 
Rwaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 
(1990). In Swaggart. the state's tax on a religious 
organization's retail sale of religious materials was challenged. 
Id. at 390. The Court held that the tax did not infringe upon 
the Swaggart Ministries' religious freedom because the payment of 
sales tax did not violate any of the ministries' sincerely held 
religious beliefs. Id. In contrast, compliance with the FEHA 
does violate Mrs. Smith’s sincerely held religious beliefs. 
Unlike the Swaggart Ministries, Mrs. Smith cannot simultaneously 
comply with both her religious beliefs and the government 
regulation. Our case is thus distinguishable because unlike in 
Swaggart, the burden on Mrs. Smith's religious freedom cannot be 
characterized as incidental.
People do not lose freedom of religion when they engage in
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business activity. In another case where the burden on religion 
occurred in a cotnmercial context, L££, 455 U.S. at 257, the Court 
found that because the payment of taxes violated the Amish 
religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social 
security system severely burdened their free exercise rights even 
though it was in a commercial context. However, the Court held 
that the social security tax was constitutional as applied to 
Lee, but only because it was justified by the overriding 
governmental interest in maintaining a nationwide social security 
system. Id^ at 257. In this case the infringement upon Mrs. 
Smith's religious freedom is unconstitutional because the 
government does not have an overriding interest in the housing 
rights of unmarried cohabiting couples as it does in providing a 
social security system. Thus, neither Lee nor any other case 
holds that a person loses the constitutional right to the free 
exercise of religion just because the conflict between religious
duty and a government regulation arises in a commercial context.
C. There Is No Compelling State Interest In Preventing
Disorimination Against Unmarried Cohabiting Couples
In The Housing Context.
In this context, a compelling interest includes "[o]nly the 
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests." Sherbert. 374 
U.S. at 406. Religious freedom is one of most highly valued 
rights in our society. Murdock v, Pennsylvania. 319 U.S. 105, 
115-17 (1943). In order to justify an infringement on religious 
freedom, Mrs, Smith's exercise of her First Amendment rights 
must create an immediate danger to a compelling interest the 
state seeks to promote. Barnette. 319 U.S. at 639. California 
does not have such a compelling interest in promoting housing
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rights of unmarried cohabiting couples.
The state does not have a compelling interest in the 
eradication of marital status discrimination. The state cannot 
rely on the mere existence of the challenged law to defeat the 
guarantee of the free exercise of religion. A state must focus 
on more than just a compelling general interest in eradicating 
invidious discrimination. This Court must focus on the 
particular type of discrimination at issue in this case, and 
where the state's interest in eradicating it lies in the 
hierarchy of its policies which must be protected, even against 
constitutional challenges. When viewed in such a hierarchy, 
marital status discrimination against an unmarried couple does 
not rank. high.
California has, in effect, sanctioned and judicially 
enforced discrimination against cohabiting couples in contexts 
other than housing. The legislature has extended many rights to 
married couples which it has refused to extend to unmarried 
couples. Elden v. Sheldon. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 274-79 (1988); Maryin 
V. Marvin. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 674 (1976). Courts have consistently 
upheld actions discriminating against unmarried couples. For 
example, in Elden. 46 Cal. 3d at 274-79, this Court held that an 
unmarried person does not have a cause of action for loss of 
consortium. Further, in Marvin. 18 Cal. 3d at 682, this Court 
held that unmarried couples do not have a right to spousal 
support. Finally, in People v. Delph. 94 Cal, App. 3d 411,
414-15 (1979) the court held that unmarried couples do not have 
the marital communication privilege. If there were a compelling 
need to prevent discrimination against unmarried couples, the
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legislature would have extended equal rights to cohabiting 
couples in response to these judicial decisions.
The legislature's failure to protect the rights of unmarried 
cohcU^iting couples reflects the state's strong interest in 
promoting marriage in order to provide "an institutional basis 
for defining the fundamental relational rights and 
responsibilities of persons in organized society." E]^sn, 46 
Cal. 3d at 275. Due to the state's strong interest in promoting 
marriage, it is unlikely that the state has a compelling interest 
to the contrary in promoting the rights of unmarried cohabiting 
couples. Therefore, there is no compelling state interest which 
justifies the severe burden which has been placed on Mrs. Smith's 
religious freedom.
Because there is not an equally compelling state interest in 
protecting all classes from discrimination, some groups are
afforded less protection than others. Cleburne v._Cl^hU^ne
Living Center. Inc.. 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) . The 
legislature did not intend to require the same protections for 
unmarried couples as those required to prevent discrimination on 
the basis of race, gender, and other groups whose protection 
warrants strict scrutiny. Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co.. 133 
Cal. App. 3d 890, 894 (1982). Marital status does not involve a 
suspect class, and has never been afforded heightened scrutiny. 
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n. 874 P. 2d 274, 289 
(Alaska 1994). In fact, the legislature has allowed public and 
private post-secondary institutions to provide accommodations 
limited on the basis of marital status, Stats. 1975, ch. 1189, 
pp. 2942-48, indicating that instances of discrimination based on
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marital status may be justified by a greater public benefit.
The law has acknowledged that marriage is still the 
foundation of family life in this country, M^ryiii, 18 Cal. 3d at 
684, and that the state has an interest in promoting the 
responsibilities of marriage. El den, 46 Cal. 3d at 274. The 
structure of society itself largely depends on the institution of 
marriage. In Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bpard; 34 
Cal. 3d 1, 9 (1983), this Court emphasized: "We reaffirm our 
recognition of a strong public policy favoring marriage. No 
similar policy favors maintenance of non-marital relationships." 
See also Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 138 Cal. App. 3d 464, 
470-71 (1982). Since there is no public policy in favor of 
promoting non-marital relationships, it cannot be said that the 
state’s interest in protecting this class is "of the highest 
order" or compelling enough to override one of the most 
fundamental rights in our society, religious freedom. Thus, the 
state's interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of 
marital status cannot meet the strict requirements set out by the 
compelling state interest test.
If, despite the discrimination allowed by California against 
unmarried cohabiting couples and the absence of any national 
policy against such discrimination, this is considered a 
"compelling" interest which is "paramount" and of "the highest 
order," the compelling state interest test is deprived of its 
meaning. Such a broad reading of the compelling state interest 
standard undermines the protections guaranteed in both the state 
and federal constitutions and the protection Congress mandated in 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
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The state's legitimate interest in providing housing for 
everyone is not endangered by exempting Mrs. Smith from the FEHA. 
This interest is served in numerous other ways. The FEHA is not 
essential to this state's interest in housing, nor is it the 
least restrictive means of promoting the state's interest. 
Exempting Mrs. Smith from the FEHA will not prevent the state 
from adequately providing housing except, in these particular 
units owned by Mrs. Smith. There is no state interest in 
providing prospective tenants with these units as opposed to any 
other decent housing unit. Also, there is no evidence of a 
housing shortage for unmarried cohabiting couples that would 
create a compelling need to prevent discrimination against this 
group in the housing context. In addition, there is no danger of 
"opening the flood gates" to further discrimination in housing 
because: 1) this analysis applies only to unmarried couples, and
not to other protected classes of individuals; 2) there must be a 
demonstrated sincere religious belief to justify exemption from 
the FEHA; and 3) it is in the economic interest of landlords as a 
class to have their rental units occupied, and thus there is an 
incentive not to discriminate against potential renters.
Any right to housing free of discrimination against 
unmarried cohabiting couples which may be granted by the FEHA is 
superseded by the constitutional right to free exercise of 
religion. The FEHC has failed to establish a compelling 
governmental interest in preventing discrimination against 
unmarried cohabiting couples. Thus, Mrs. Smith's legitimate 




For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the California 
Court of Appeal exempting Mrs. Smith from the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act should be affirmed.
Dated: October 26, 1995 Respectfully Submitted,
Counsel for Respondent
